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3 THE EFFECT OF THE ECB’S MONETARY POLICIES IN THE RECENT PERIOD
Since spring 2014 the Governing Council of the ECB has deployed a broad raft of monetary 
policy actions to avoid the materialisation of risks arising from a situation of excessively low 
inflation over an extended period. The actions revolved around four broad strategic lines 
which include: setting a negative interest rate on the deposit facility; forward guidance on 
the future path of policy rates; the use of specific programmes directed at the transmission 
channels operating through bank intermediaries and the credit supply; and the 
implementation of a quantitative easing programme involving the large-scale purchase of 
private and public assets – for an amount equivalent to around 17 percentage points (pp) 
of euro area GDP during its first two years in operation. 
This chapter provides evidence that shows how the ECB’s actions have been effective in 
providing the monetary stimulus required by the demanding macroeconomic situation. It 
has done so by easing the financial conditions faced by economic agents both in the euro 
area as a whole and in the Spanish economy. In particular, it is estimated that the ECB’s 
measures have been responsible for the reduction of around 100  basis points (bp) in 
average euro area long-term sovereign debt yields and of 130 bp in the case of Spain. By 
using different quantitative tools, the chapter assesses the contribution of the ECB’s 
policies to GDP growth and inflation during 2015 and 2016, identifying some asymmetry in 
the strength of the effects by country. For the euro area as a whole, it is estimated that the 
ECB’s actions have contributed to raising the level of GDP and of prices by around 1.4 pp 
and 1.2 pp, respectively, at end-2016. In the case of the Spanish economy, the estimated 
impact would be close to 1.2 pp on GDP and around 0.9 pp on prices.
Despite the extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy stance, the growth outlook for 
the area remains modest and medium-term inflation expectations are clearly below the 
benchmark of 2%. To reduce the risks of a protracted scenario of low economic growth 
and overly low inflation, and to lay the foundations for a stronger and sounder recovery of 
activity and employment, there is an ever pressing need for the involvement of other 
economic policies – particularly in the fiscal and structural arenas and in the area of 
strengthening the institutional arrangements of economic and monetary union.
In 2014 the ECB embarked on a new expansionary phase in its monetary policy against a 
background of weak recovery in the euro area economy and excessively low inflation. The 
situation required the implementation of a broad raft of actions to overcome the restrictions 
arising from the increasingly narrow margin for reducing nominal interest rates. In addition 
to introducing a slightly negative interest rate on the deposit facility, the ECB stepped up 
the monetary impulse by providing long-term funding to the banking system and in 2015 
took the historic step of introducing a large-scale Asset Purchase Programme. The 
worsening of the outlook for inflation last year and at the start of this year made it necessary 
to strengthen the stimulus from these measures and to fine-tune them.
This chapter analyses the latest expansionary phase of ECB monetary policy, paying 
particular attention to the Asset Purchase Programme and its transmission mechanisms, 
since this is the most novel feature in the recent implementation of monetary policy in the 
euro area. This chapter analyses the main effects of the central bank’s various actions 
since mid-2014 on financial and credit conditions as well as the impact on economic 
activity and inflation for the euro area and Spanish economies.
1  Introduction
Against a background of weak 
recovery in the euro area 
economy and excessively low 
inflation, the ECB embarked 
on a new expansionary phase 
in its monetary policy in 2014.
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At the start of 2015, the ECB Governing Council decided to expand the Asset Purchase 
Programmes then in place to include government debt securities. This measure was 
adopted in the context of a new phase of ECB actions initiated in mid-2014, in which the 
size and composition of the balance sheet would become the main tool for setting the 
monetary policy stance, since there was practically no room for manoeuvre left in the 
conventional sphere. The initial calibration of the expanded Asset Purchase Programme 
envisaged monthly purchases of euro-denominated public and private securities1 for 
€60 billion, until the inflation rate returned to a sustained convergence path in line with the 
medium-term objective, or at least until September 2016. This entailed a liquidity injection 
of more than €1,100 billion (around 11% of euro area GDP), so that the ECB balance sheet, 
which accounted for around 20% of GDP at the beginning of 2015, would expand to 
slightly more than 30% of GDP by the end of the minimum 19-month programme period 
(see Chart 3.1).
The decision to buy public debt marked a quantum leap in the actions adopted by the 
ECB since the summer of 2014. Thus, on the one hand, the Governing Council reduced 
official interest rates, bringing the rate for main refinancing operations down to 0.05% 
and credit and deposit facility rates to 0.30% and -0.20%, respectively, in September 
2014. In a setting of excess liquidity, in which the main refinancing operations are 
conducted with full allotment, the remuneration on the deposit facility becomes the 
main reference determining yields in the money markets and shaping expectations 
about interest rates. On the other, the decision was taken to create a new, longer-term, 
bank financing facility linked to the size and growth of banks’ loan portfolios, the so-
called “targeted longer-term refinancing operations” (TLTRO). In a context of very timid 
credit growth, this specific measure aimed to strengthen the monetary transmission 
channel that operates through bank intermediation. Furthermore, two private Asset 
Purchase Programmes were launched in the corresponding financing markets for banks 
2  A new phase in ECB 
actions
In 2015, the ECB embarked on 
a quantitative easing 
programme...
...which marked a quantum 
leap in the actions that the 
ECB had been adopting until 
then.
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1  To take account of the specific institutional features of the Monetary Union, where monetary policy exists 
alongside the fiscal policies of 19 Member States, a partial financial risk-sharing system was set up for the 
government debt securities portfolio, whereby only 20% of potential losses would be shared. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 67 ANNUAL REPORT, 2015 3. THE EFFECT OF THE ECB’S MONETARY POLICIES IN THE RECENT PERIOD
in the euro area: the programme known as CBPP3, for covered bonds (such as cédulas 
hipotecarias in Spain), and the ABSPP, for simple and transparent securitisations whose 
underlying assets include loans to households and corporations in the euro area. Both 
programmes, announced in September 2014, were launched in the final quarter of that 
year, with purchases both in primary and secondary markets (see Table 3.1).
The large-scale Asset Purchase Programme was the Council’s response to the challenge 
of ensuring the gradual return of the inflation rate, negative at the time, to levels closer to 
the reference value of 2%.2 This challenge had to be addressed in a particularly complex 
macroeconomic setting, characterised by a very weak economic recovery and a slightly 
contractionary fiscal policy in the euro area as a whole (see Chart 3.2). Although the fall in 
inflation provided a stimulus for the economy in the short term by improving agents’ 
purchasing power, the prospect of an inflation rate that remained too low for a prolonged 
period would eventually constrain aggregate demand, already weakened in some 
countries by the ongoing deleveraging process, with a rise in real financing costs and the 
debt burden. Furthermore, this prospect jeopardised the proper anchoring of inflation 
expectations, and the very credibility of the monetary policy objective. With nominal 
rigidities in prices and wages, a scenario of excessively low inflation also hampered the 
ongoing absorption of the imbalances in terms of competitiveness in some euro area 
countries.3
The Asset Purchase 
Programme stemmed from a 
context of weak growth and 
inflation prospects that were 
far removed from the medium-
term monetary policy 
objective.
PPSCPPSPPPSBA3PPBC
Covered bond purchase 
programme
Asset-backed securities 
purchase programme
Public sector purchase 
programme
Corporate sector 
purchase programme
Private debt Private debt Public debt Private debt
Covered bonds
Simple transparent 
securitisations whose 
underlying assets are loans 
to the non-financial private 
sector
Bonds issued by central 
government and by 
supranational agencies and 
institutions in the euro area. 
Programme extended in 
December 2015 to regional 
and local government issues 
in the euro area
Non-bank corporate bonds
Market Secondary Primary (a) /secondary
Announcement/start September/October 2014 September/December 2014 January/March 2015 March/June 2016
Running to
Volume of purchases
Reinvestment policy
Volume purchaased (€bn)
——2034102 dnE
—194513415102 dnE
—727912716102 lirpA
Type of security
March 2017 at least (extended in December 2015 relative to the initial date of September 2016)
€60 bn monthly from March 2015 to March 2016, €80 bn from April 2016
Redeemed amounts are re-invested for as long as is necessary
Primary/secondary
ECB EXPANDED ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMMES TABLE 3.1
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Issues of entities with the status of a public corporation may not be purchased on the primary market.
2  See Chapter  2 of the 2014 Annual Report of the Banco de España for a more detailed description of these 
measures.
3  See Chapter  4 of the 2014 Annual Report of the Banco de España for an analysis of the channels through which 
de-anchoring of inflation expectations has negative effects at the aggregate level.
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c The indicator is constructed for a parametrisation of price stability defined by the interval (1.8%-2%) following L. Killian and S. Manganelli (2007), "Quantifying the 
Risk of Deflation", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 39, No. 2/3, pp. 561-590.  The probability that inflation is situated outside this interval is calculated 
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View, Working Paper, Banco de España, forthcoming.
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As analysed in greater detail in the following sections, the announcement and implementation 
of the Asset Purchase Programme contributed to easing financial conditions in the early 
months of 2015 and helped the economy in the euro area to gradually consolidate its 
recovery. Economic growth relied increasingly on the contribution of domestic demand 
and, particularly, of private consumption, underpinned by improved consumer confidence 
and higher purchasing power arising from job creation and cheaper energy prices. 
Investment, which had been notably subdued and weighed down by the weak prospects 
for growth in demand, experienced a muted improvement, despite the fact that financing 
costs, business confidence, profits and capacity utilisation performed favourably.
In the second half of 2015 and the early months of 2016, it became clear that global growth 
was not immune to the signs of slowdown observed in the emerging economies since the 
summer. The global implications of a slowdown in the pace of growth of the Chinese 
economy and the readjustment in its growth pattern, along with the marked downward 
path of oil prices, also gave rise to episodes of instability in international financial markets 
and capital flows, leading to a widespread downward revision of global growth projections 
and a moderation of the expected pace of normalisation of the Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy stance. These events were reflected in the euro area, where lower dynamism in 
exports was only partially offset by the fall in oil prices. Notwithstanding the above, GDP 
continued on a path of moderate recovery and rose by 1.5% in the whole of 2015, as 
compared with 0.9% in 2014.
The sharp fall in oil prices, which began in mid-2014 and became more marked from May 
2015 on, affected euro area inflation more than expected, the latter remaining close to zero 
in the second half of 2015 and start of 2016. In parallel, private analysts and international 
organisations significantly scaled back their forecasts for 2016. In the case of the 
Eurosystem, the inflation forecast for this year based on their macroeconomic projection 
exercises fell from 1.5% in March 2015 to 0.1% a year later.
Beyond the obvious direct effects of falling oil prices on the general price index, as 2015 
progressed, the medium- and long-term inflation expectation indicators dropped to very 
low levels, below those observed before the launch of the Programme. Moreover, the 
correlation between these indicators and those referring to shorter-term inflation 
expectations pointed to possible problems regarding the anchoring of inflation expectations. 
The March 2016 ECB staff macroeconomic projections foresaw the inflation for 2017 and 
2018 at 1.3% and 1.6%, respectively, clearly far from the medium-term objective of 
monetary policy.
The worsening global macroeconomic outlook from mid-2015 led to a substantial increase in 
risks regarding compliance with the medium-term target set for price stability, as shown in the 
balance of risks indicator in Chart 3.2. This situation led to the ECB Governing Council 
announcing, in October 2015, its intention to review the monetary policy stance so as to ensure 
that it was appropriate for the new macroeconomic setting. Thus, in December 2015 and March 
2016, it adopted a broad package of additional stimulus measures which affected official 
interest rates on one hand, and the size and composition of the ECB’s balance sheet on the 
other, through a dual channel: the expansion of the Asset Purchase Programme and a new 
TLTRO series, aimed at strengthening monetary policy transmission through the credit channel.
The ECB reduced the deposit facility rate by 10 bp, both in December and in March, to 
leave it standing at -0.40%. Also, in March, the rate of main refinancing operations and the 
marginal lending facility rate were reduced by 5 bp, to 0% and 0.25%, respectively. As part 
The announcement and 
implementation of the 
programme helped to boost 
internal demand, due to the 
favourable effect it had on 
financial conditions
However, the economic 
recovery lost momentum as a 
result of the worsening global 
growth outlook after the 
summer months...
...which reduced the rate of 
inflation, strongly influenced 
by the changes in energy 
prices...
...and had a very negative 
impact on the prospects of the 
inflation rate making a 
sustained return to levels 
closer to the medium-term 
reference rate of 2%...
...which prompted the ECB 
Governing Council to adopt 
additional stimulus measures 
in December 2015 and March 
2016
The ECB Governing Council 
reduced official interest 
rates,...
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of the communication policy on the future stance of monetary policy, the Council also 
indicated that official interest rates would remain at those, or lower, levels for a prolonged 
period and, in any event, beyond the time frame of the net acquisitions envisaged under 
the Asset Purchase Programme. With this communication strategy, the ECB tried to ensure 
that short-term interest rate movements passed more efficiently through to the rest of the 
yield curve.
With respect to the Asset Purchase Programme, the Council recalibrated certain 
parameters in order to boost its effects. In December 2015, it extended the programme by 
six months, until March 2017, conditional upon the Council observing a sustained change 
in the inflation rate to levels approaching 2%. It was also announced that maturing 
securities purchased under the programme would be reinvested for as long as required. 
The longer time frame and the reinvestment policy will lead to a significant increase in 
liquidity until 2019, of around €680 billion (6.5% of GDP). Also, the universe of eligible 
government assets was adjusted to include debt issued by regional and local governments 
in the euro area, provided that they meet the remaining eligibility criteria, such as a 
minimum credit rating.
In March 2016, the Council decided to increase the volume of monthly purchases to 
€80 billion and to include as eligible assets under the programme bonds from the non-
banking corporate sector, by means of the new Corporate Sector Purchase Programme 
(“CSPP”; see Table 3.1). The CSPP aims to contribute to reducing the cost of corporate 
bond issues and, insofar as there is a shift in larger firms’ financing decisions towards the 
fixed income markets, it is also expected to have a positive side-effect on the supply of 
bank loans to smaller firms.
Also with the aim of strengthening the transmission channel which operates through the 
supply of bank loans, in March the Council announced a new series of four targeted 
longer-term refinancing operations (known as TLTRO-II), to be implemented as from June 
2016. These operations will have a four-year maturity and the same fixed rate as the main 
refinancing operations, which could be brought down to the level of the deposit facility rate 
if the loan portfolio exceeds a reference benchmark.
In a setting where the scope for reducing short-term interest is limited, large-scale Asset 
Purchase Programmes are an effective tool to stimulate aggregate demand, since they 
affect long-term interest rates, prices and asset returns. The literature based on recent 
experience highlights two key mechanisms in the transmission process4.
The first of these is known as the “signalling channel”, which capture the effect of these 
measures on agents’ expectations over the future monetary policy stance. The prospect of 
lower official interest rates or of rates kept at low levels over a more prolonged period 
immediately influences longer-term rates, insofar as the yield on a long-term bond reflects, 
among other things, the expected short-term rates throughout the life of the instrument5. 
The signalling channel reinforces the effects of other measures which also have an impact 
...expanded the Asset 
Purchase Programme, both in 
terms of duration and amount 
and type of eligible assets...
... and introduced a new series 
of longer-term refinancing 
operations
3  Transmission channels 
for quantitative easing 
measures
3.1  TRANSMISSION TO 
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Asset purchase programmes 
affect long-term interest rates, 
mainly through two channels: 
the signalling channel, which 
strengthens the central bank’s 
communication policy...
4  For a broader discussion of these and other channels, see, for example, Krishnamurthy and A. Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2011), The effects of Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Autumn, pp. 215-287.
5  Moreover, as the uncertainty over possible changes in official interest rates is reduced, a certain decline may be 
expected in the term premium, that is, the excess yield demanded by investors for investing in the longer-term, 
as compensation for possible fluctuations in bond prices in the event of unexpected changes in interest rates.
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on official interest-rate expectations6, such as the publication of guidelines on the future 
path of monetary policy (“forward guidance”)7.
Quantitative easing measures are also transmitted to asset prices through the 
adjustments they bring about in investor portfolios. This is known as the “portfolio 
rebalancing channel”. When the central bank purchases securities, it does so against 
central bank reserves, which are often not perfect substitutes for the assets purchased. 
Consequently, investors seek to rebalance their portfolios to reinvest this liquidity, either 
by purchasing the same type of asset as that sold or other close substitutes, which tends 
to bring down returns on assets on the whole (and push up the price)8. The size of the 
effects will depend on the specific characteristics of the assets purchased, such as credit 
risk and duration. The effect of euro-denominated asset purchases on the exchange rate 
also forms an integral part of this channel. The exchange rate will tend to depreciate, 
either due to the increase in the demand for assets denominated in foreign currencies by 
euro area investors as a result of the portfolio rebalancing process, or to the decrease in 
the holdings of euro-denominated assets by foreign investors in a context of falling 
returns.
In the case of the ECB, reducing the deposit facility rate to negative levels has served to 
reinforce the effects of the Asset Purchase Programme in two ways. On one hand, the 
decrease in the remuneration on the deposit facility directly affects current interbank market 
rates and interest rate expectations, compressing longer-term rates. On the other, the higher 
cost of maintaining excess liquidity in the Eurosystem provides an incentive for reinvesting 
in alternative assets and for bank lending. This innovation, shared with other central banks 
in Europe and Japan, has shown that the lower bound of nominal interest rates is not 
necessarily 0%, since cash holdings can yield negative returns once the storage, distribution 
and insurance costs have been taken into account. However, the capacity to generate 
additional impulses by pushing negative official rates further down is limited. Below a certain 
negative value, not easy to identify, the difficulty of passing through negative rates to retail 
deposits could prevent them from being transmitted to the cost of lending transactions or 
lead to a narrowing of margins which would hamper banks’ intermediation capacity.
Recent experience has allowed for empirical evidence to be gathered on the effects of 
Asset Purchase Programmes on long-term interest rates. However, the broad range of 
available estimates illustrates the difficulties involved in empirical exercises and the 
specific features of the different programmes. In the case of the United States Federal 
Reserve, Williams (2014)9 estimates that $600 billion of asset purchases (approximately 
3% of GDP) would lower ten-year yields by around 15 bp to 25 bp. According to the author, 
...and the portfolio rebalancing 
channel
The expansionary effects are 
reinforced by the negative 
remuneration on the deposit 
facility
Empirical evidence finds that 
asset purchase programmes 
have positive effects on long-
term interest rates, although 
there is uncertainty as to the 
scale of these effects
6  Studies highlighting the importance of this channel compared with others in the case of the Federal Reserve 
include J. Christensen and G. D. Rudebush (2012), “The response of interest rates to US and UK quantitative 
easing”, Economic Journal, November, nº  122, pp.  385-414, and M. Bauer and G. Rudebusch (2014), “The 
signaling channel for Federal Reserve bond purchases”, International Journal of Central Banking, nº  10, pp. 
233-289.
7  For more details see, for example, S. López and P. del Río (2013), “El uso de la orientación de expectativas o 
forward guidance como instrumento de política monetaria”, Boletín Económico, December, Banco de España.
8  For this effect to occur, certain financial market imperfections must be present to allow for interest rates to react 
to the supply of bonds available to private investors. Specifically, the literature identifies a liquidity shortage 
channel where, in the presence of investors with a preferred environment (such as pension funds or insurance 
companies with a more conservative and long-term investment profile), the demand for the assets purchased by 
the central bank does not decline, thus pushing up the prices. Alternatively, the effect on the price can also be 
explained by the fact that the central bank’s asset purchases lower the risk level of private investor portfolios (for 
example, duration risk), exerting downward pressure on risk premia.
9  J. C. Williams (2014), “Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound. Putting Theory into Practice”, Hutchins Center 
on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at Brookings, January.
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this would be the equivalent of a cut in the federal funds rate of around 75 bp to 100 bp. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, Joyce et al.10 (2011) estimate that the Asset Purchase 
Programme of the Bank of England, amounting to £200 billion or 11% of GDP, contributed 
to reducing long-term interest rates by around 100 bp. In Japan, a review by the central 
bank itself suggests that the programme launched in April 2014 lowered ten-year rates by 
30 bp in the first two years since its introduction, 80 bp in real terms, taking into account 
the upward revision of inflation expectations11. 
The changes described in financial conditions contribute to combating possible deflationary 
tensions by boosting demand through the usual transmission channels of conventional 
monetary stimulus. Thus, lower real interest rates favour the bringing forward of current 
consumption decisions and expand spending on investment and durable consumption since 
they reduce the user cost of capital. There is also an impact in disposable income12 and 
positive wealth effects13 through asset revaluations. The scale of these effects depends on 
the size and composition of agents’ balance sheets and on the distribution of financial assets 
among the population. In the case of the public sector, savings in financing costs, and the 
consequent freeing up of funds, should facilitate the ongoing consolidation processes.
Given the high presence of banks in the euro area, the effects of monetary policy measures 
are expected to occur largely through changes in the availability and cost of loans. The fall 
in interest rates reduces the cost of funding for banks and allows them to apply lower 
interest rates on new loans, stimulating demand for financing and, consequently, spending. 
Furthermore, the rise in asset prices contributes to strengthening the net worth of banks, 
which will experience an increase in their lending capacity, and that of their borrowers, 
which will see the value of their collateral grow. From the supply standpoint, a backdrop of 
low returns encourages portfolio rebalancing towards higher-risk assets which should 
stimulate lending.
Exchange rate depreciation improves price competitiveness of goods produced in the 
euro area and increases net exports, with expansionary effects on aggregate demand and 
inflation. It also has a direct effect on inflation insofar as it raises the prices of imported 
goods and services, whether these relate to final consumption or intermediate goods.
The available studies, focusing especially on the experience of the United States and the 
United Kingdom, generally identify that this type of programmes has a positive effect on 
activity and prices. However, the disparity in the magnitude of their estimated effects 
reveals a very high degree of uncertainty which is even greater than in the case of financial 
variables. The various approaches in the empirical literature differ in very significant 
aspects such as the assumptions which permit the identification of what constitutes an 
exogenous monetary policy stimulus in the non-conventional sphere.
3.2  TRANSMISSION TO 
AGGREGATE DEMAND AND 
PRICES 
Changes in financial 
conditions contribute to 
countering deflationary 
tensions through the usual 
transmission channels
The credit and exchange rate 
channels are particularly 
important in the euro area
Empirical evidence of the 
macroeconomic impact of 
quantitative easing measures 
is not very extensive
10  M. A. Joyce, A. Lasaosa, I. Stevens, y M. Tong (2011), “The financial market reaction of quantitative easing in 
the United Kingdom”. International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 7, nº 3, pp 113-161.
11  This is the impact of a programme involving 110,000 billion yen, the amount by which the central bank’s 
holdings of government debt securities increased to December 2014. See Bank of Japan (2015), Quantitative 
and Qualitative Monetary Easing: assessment of its effects in the two years since its introduction, Bank of Japan 
Review, May.
12  In general, there will be a positive effect for net debtors insofar as lower interest rates feed through to debt 
servicing costs, increasing their spending capacity. In the case of creditors, however, the future earnings on 
their assets will fall, with a contractionary effect on their gross disposable income.
13  These effects will foreseeably be less powerful in the euro area than in the United States owing to the smaller 
holdings of financial assets whose valuation fluctuates according to market conditions, such as bonds and, in 
particular, shares. See, for example, OECD (2015), “Quantitative easing and household wealth” Box 1.4 
Economic Outlook Vol. 1.
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According to the summary in Constâncio  (2015)14, the available studies for the United 
States estimate effects of between 0.2% and 1.7% on the level of GDP and between 0 pp 
and 1.7 pp on the level of inflation per every $1,000 billion of purchases (equivalent to 
5.5% of the country’s GDP). More recent studies, such as that by Engen et al. (2015)15, 
have estimated that the size of these effects is slightly lower. In the case of the United 
Kingdom, it is estimated that the Bank of England’s programme has had a positive effect 
ranging from 1% to 3% on the level of GDP and from 0.2 pp to 2.5 pp for inflation. However, 
the hypothetical adverse effects which would have occurred if these measures had not 
been applied were not estimated in any of these studies.
Since May 201416, nominal interest rates in the euro area have decreased along the entire 
yield curve. This decrease was sharper at the longer end of the curve, with interest rates 
ultimately turning negative even at relatively long maturities (see Chart 3.3). For instance, 
the interest rate curve based on euro area sovereign debt yields – for all issuers – decreased 
notably and levelled off significantly. For maturities of three and ten years the reduction was 
around 75 bp and 150 bp during the two-year period analysed and stood at 0.2% and 1%, 
respectively, at the cut-off date of this report. This decline was not uniform across countries. 
While ten-year German Bund yields declined by around 130 bp to below 0.2%, Spanish 
sovereign debt yields decreased by approximately 140 bp to 1.6% and in the case of Italy 
they fell about 150  bp to 1.5%. The yield on covered bonds issued in the euro area 
experienced a fall of some 120 bp. Other financing instruments also seem to have benefited 
from these trends. The exchange rate depreciated notably (by around 20% against the 
dollar), influenced by the increasingly different monetary policy stance of the Eurosystem 
and the Federal Reserve which in the case of the latter is less accommodative.
The fall in inflation expectations meant, however, that the easing of financial conditions 
was lower in real terms than in nominal terms. For example, the decline of around 100 bp 
in the real yield on ten-year bonds, which stood at levels close to 1%, is 50 bp lower than 
the nominal decline. In this respect panel 2 of Chart 3.3 shows the downward shift and 
levelling-off in the term structure of real interest rates as from May 2014.
It is very difficult to isolate the effect on financial markets of a specific monetary policy 
decision compared with effects caused by other factors such as revisions of the outlook 
for growth or inflation, changes in the perceived solvency of various institutional sectors, 
reforms undertaken by certain Member States or progress made in European governance. 
A commonly used approach to isolate this impact on financial variables is to analyse the 
response of respective asset prices to different announcements of monetary policy actions. 
The core assumption is that market prices would react relatively rapidly to central bank 
announcements, whereas flows of purchases, insofar as they do not provide additional 
information, would not generate additional expansionary effects on their own. The use of 
this methodology called event study is not without practical difficulties. In particular, it 
requires selecting the size of the time window during which changes in prices are measured. 
A very short time span will probably tend to underestimate the effects; however, extending 
it increases the possibility that the measurement will be biased by the occurrence of other 
factors. The simultaneous announcement of several measures also raises specific 
4  An estimation of the 
effects of the ECB 
monetary policy on 
financial and credit 
conditions
4.1  THE EFFECTS ON THE 
EURO AREA AS A WHOLE
Since spring 2014, financing 
conditions in the euro area as 
a whole have eased 
significantly
The analysis of the response 
of asset prices to monetary 
policy announcements is not 
without difficulties...
14  V. Constâncio (2015), US Monetary Policy Forum Panel discussion on Central Banking with Large Balance 
Sheets, presentation in New York, 27 February.
15  E. M. Engen, T. Laubach and D. Reifschneider (2015), “The Macroeconomic Effects of the Federal Reserve’s 
Unconventional Monetary Policies”, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-005, Washington, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
16  The period considered is from 7 May 2014, the day before the Governing Council meeting at which the ECB 
indicated the need to adjust the monetary policy stance, to 23 May 2016, the cut-off date of this report.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 74 ANNUAL REPORT, 2015 3. THE EFFECT OF THE ECB’S MONETARY POLICIES IN THE RECENT PERIOD
problems since it prevents the corresponding effects from being identified separately, as 
in the case of the ECB with TLTROs, Asset Purchase Programmes, official interest rate 
decisions and various refinements of its communications policy. Finally, a further difficulty 
lies in the fact that financial markets usually anticipate the effects of possible subsequent 
official announcements where the publication of macroeconomic data or public speeches 
by monetary policy-makers fuel expectations that the central bank will act. Measuring the 
impact of the decisions taken, for example, in December 2015 and in March 2016 is 
particularly complicated owing to the presence of considerable anticipatory effects in a 
context of high volatility in financial markets
With these caveats, this event study methodology was used to approximate the impact of 
the monetary policy decisions of the ECB Governing Council as from May 2014. The 
exercise is conducted by considering a two-day time window – namely, between the close 
of the day before and that of the day after the announcement of the measures – for a total 
…however, with certain 
caveats, it attributes a large 
share of the easing of financial 
conditions to monetary policy…
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0.012 for the stock exchange — the first three are included in the index with a negative sign. Given that the changes observed in the variables are not only the 
result of genuine shocks affecting them, but also of their endogenous performance, the value of the financial conditions index cannot be interpreted directly as 
an indicator of the monetary policy stance.
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of 36 dates when the Council announced measures, accounts of meetings were published 
or speeches were made by distinguished members of the Council that anticipated the 
possibility of actions being adopted shortly.17
The results of the exercise, presented in Chart 3.4 indicate that monetary policy measures 
have made an appreciable contribution to the easing of financial conditions in the euro area 
CHANGES IN FINANCIAL VARIABLES DURING THE RECENT PHASE OF ECB ACTION CHART 3.4
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17  Until March 2015, the dates were selected in accordance with ECB (2015), The transmission of the ECB´s recent 
non-standard monetary policy measures, Economic Bulletin, No 7 and C. Altavilla, G. Carboni and R. Motto 
(2015), Asset purchase programmes and financial markets: lessons from the euro area, Working Paper, No 1864, 
November, European Central Bank. Other dates considered relevant were added to the aforementioned ones 
so that the exercise is extended until the Governing Council meeting in March 2016.
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since May 2014. The impacts estimated are higher in the case of assets included in the 
purchase programme – government debt and covered bonds18 – and the longer the 
maturity and the higher the risk level, the greater the impacts. Thus, it is estimated that the 
ECB’s measures would be responsible for around 100 bp of the reduction in euro area 
long-term sovereign debt yields, although this effect would be higher for the securities 
which initially had higher risk premia: approximately 130 bp and 150 bp for Spanish and 
Italian sovereign debt, respectively, compared with 30 bp in the case of the German Bund. 
It is estimated that the effect on covered bond yields was around 40 bp, whereas in the 
case of yields on the BBB bonds of non-financial and financial corporations it was 
approximately 70 bp and 110 bp, respectively.
Despite the losses posted by stock market indices since May 2014, the Eurosystem’s 
expansionary monetary policy is estimated to have contributed to raising equity prices by 
more than 15% in the case of the EUROSTOXX index, according to the estimations of the 
exercise. The analysis seems to indicate that as a result of the ECB’s measures, the 
nominal effective exchange rate depreciated 10% and the exchange rate against the dollar 
declined by around 12%.
Lastly, it should be emphasised that medium-term inflation expectations of market 
indicators had a positive, albeit modest, reaction to the announcements of the ECB’s 
measures. For example, the exercise estimates that the latter would have increased two-
year inflation expectations two years ahead based on inflation swaps by 10 bp. In any 
event, the size of the estimated effect is insufficient to offset the tightening of financial 
conditions in real terms which has involved a cumulative fall of 40 bp by the indicator since 
May 2014.
The banks in the euro area also took advantage of the widespread loosening of financial 
conditions which resulted in the lower cost of debt issuance in capital markets against a 
backdrop where they had the possibility of accessing long-term central bank funding at 
very low interest rates through the TLTROs. In turn, retail deposits rates were also subject 
to downward pressure on account of the levels of money market interest rates, some of 
which were even negative.
On the asset side, banks passed through the rate reduction to the interest rates on loan 
transactions. As shown in Chart 3.4, the sharpest fall was in the loans extended to 
corporations for an amount of less than one million euro, targeted mainly at SMEs. The 
qualitative indicators of the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) and the Survey on the Access to 
Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) in the euro area also indicate that access to credit has 
improved. According to the BLS, banks reported that both TLTROs and the Asset Purchase 
Programme seem to have contributed significantly to the easing of credit conditions, 
whereas the impact of these programmes on lending standards seems to have been more 
limited.
These circumstances fostered the gradual recovery in lending to the private sector in 
the euro area during 2015 and in 2016 to date. Although the improvement was 
widespread by country, the respective rates of increase diverged considerably as a 
result of the deleveraging processes under way in several euro area countries. Thus, 
lending to the private sector halted its decline, which was still visible at end-2014, and 
…including stock market 
gains and a depreciation of 
the exchange rate,…
…and a modest improvement 
in medium-term inflation 
expectations
The loosening of financial 
conditions resulted in a 
reduction in the costs of 
liabilities for euro area banks...
...which the latter passed 
through in the form of better 
terms and conditions for bank 
loans...
...and it triggered a slight 
recovery in credit
18  The scant buoyancy of primary securitisation markets, still feeling the toll of regulatory uncertainty, among other 
factors, prevented the ABSPP purchase programme from being ambitiously deployed.
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is currently expanding at a year-on-year rate of around 1% in the area as a whole. The 
stock of loans to households and non-financial corporations continued to decrease in 
year-on-year terms in countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland.
In line with the available evidence for the euro area and other geographical areas, the 
analysis performed suggests that the monetary policy actions adopted by the ECB have 
had a considerable impact on financial conditions in the euro area. This impact occurred 
despite the fact that the ECB took these decisions at a time when, having overcome the 
most acute bouts of financial instability which affected the euro area in 2011-2012, 
financing conditions had already loosened considerably. The fact that purchases by the 
Eurosystem targeted securities with longer maturities and covered a broad range of credit 
ratings seems to have resulted in the programme being more effective and having a 
stronger impact on term premia and credit risk premia.
The financial conditions of the Spanish economy followed a similar pattern to those 
described for the euro area, although interest rates fell slightly more sharply in Spain. For 
instance, among the instruments included in the Eurosystem’s purchase programme, the 
nominal yield on ten-year government debt has decreased by approximately 140 bp since 
May 2014 to levels of around 1.6% while that on long-term covered bonds has declined by 
more than 160 bp and that on long-term bond issues of non-financial corporations (NFCs) 
has fallen by around 145 bp. This trend fed through to varying degrees to other financial 
instruments not included in the programme. It is estimated that the cost of equity19 of 
NFCs decreased by around 120 bp in this period. Given that long-term inflation expectations 
fell during these two years, the real reduction in financing costs seems to have ranged, 
according to the maturity of the instrument, from 50 bp to 60 bp20 which is more moderate 
than the nominal change.
The impact attributable to monetary policy actions in the reduction of financing costs in 
the case of the Spanish economy is greater than for the euro area as a whole. In fact, by 
using the event study methodology in the previous section, these impacts, in nominal 
terms, are calculated to be around 130 bp for ten-year government debt, approximately 
60 bp for covered bonds, almost 90 bp for the cost of long-term bond issues of NFCs and 
slightly more than 80 bp for the sector’s equity21 (see panel 2 of Chart 3.5). In real terms, 
the impacts estimated seem to have been only marginally higher, given the modest 
reaction of inflation expectations to the ECB’s measures. The effect on stock market 
prices during this period was also significant, amounting to more than 15% in the case of 
the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index, in line with what was seen for the EUROSTOXX 
index.
As shown in panel 3 of Chart 3.5, the widespread reduction in interest rates was also 
reflected in the cost of bank deposits which represent the bulk of their liabilities. Banks 
which also had access to TLTRO funds passed the lower funding costs through to interest 
rates on loans. As in the euro area, the decline was across all segments, albeit sharper in 
In conclusion, the available 
evidence suggests that the 
raft of monetary policy actions 
applied by the ECB in the last 
two years has contributed to a 
considerable loosening of 
credit conditions
4.2  THE EFFECTS ON 
FINANCIAL AND CREDIT 
CONDITIONS IN THE 
SPANISH ECONOMY
The financial conditions of the 
Spanish economy followed a 
similar pattern to those 
described for the euro area 
with sharp falls in financing 
costs...
...partly as a result of the 
Eurosystem’s expansionary 
monetary policy
Credit institutions passed 
through the decline in their 
funding costs to interest rates 
on loans...
19  The cost of equity is estimated using Gordon’s dividend discount model.
20  Inflation expectations are approximated using inflation swaps.
21  In this case, the estimate probably represents the lower bound of the true impact which was calculated under 
the assumption that monetary policy has no effect on dividend growth. In particular, Gordon’s dividend discount 
model shows that the change in the cost of corporations’ equity is approximately the same as the difference 
between the dividend yield ratio and the dividend growth rate. Consequently, assuming that this variable does 
not change, the variation in the cost of equity coincides approximately with the change in the dividend yield 
ratio. This ratio was calculated using the available information on Spanish listed non-financial corporations.
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higher risk ones such as loans to NFCs for an amount of less than one million euro, where 
transactions with SMEs are concentrated, and lending to households for consumption and 
other purposes. In both cases, the cost of these funds started out from considerably 
higher levels than those observed in the core euro area countries
In addition to the decrease in the cost of bank credit, available evidence points to an 
improvement in access to this type of financing during the period analysed. This is also 
indicated, for example, by the qualitative findings of the BLS and, to a greater extent, by 
those of the SAFE and also by the quantitative information of the Central Credit Register 
of the Banco de España.22
The responses of Spanish banks participating in the BLS confirm that both the TLTROs 
and the Asset Purchase Programme seem to have contributed to the improvement in their 
liquidity and profitability situation and to the decline in their financing costs, seemingly to 
a greater degree than in the euro area as a whole23 (see panels 5 and 6 of Chart 3.5). 
Spanish banks also pointed out that these two actions contributed to the easing of credit 
conditions and that this, once again, occurred to a greater degree in Spain than in the euro 
area. The microeconomic evidence presented in Box 3.1 suggests that these effects were 
slightly stronger in the case of Spanish banks, which started out from less generous 
funding conditions and participated more intensively in the TLTROs, particularly those for 
loans to NFCs.
In order to approximate the portion of the decline in the cost of bank credit attributable to 
conventional and non-conventional monetary policy measures, several econometric 
models available at the Banco de España were used. These models relate the level of 
lending rates in each segment to variables such as interbank interest rates (which 
approximate market interest rates), the unemployment rate (which includes the effect of 
the economic cycle through credit risk premia) and the spread between Spanish ten-year 
government debt and the swap rate at the same term24. On the basis of these equations, 
lending rates in the absence of monetary policy measures25 were projected, which allows 
the effect of the measures to be estimated as the difference in relation to said projection. 
The results of this exercise are shown in the form of ranges in panel 2 of Chart 3.5. The 
average effect estimated ranged from 30 bp to 90 bp and was highest in the segment of 
loans to firms for amounts of less than one million euro.
... and relaxed lending 
standards
The available evidence 
suggests that part of the 
improvement in credit 
conditions is attributable to 
the Eurosystem’s 
expansionary monetary policy
22  For more details on the results of the SAFE, see the Box “Evolución reciente del acceso de las pymes españolas 
a la financiación externa de acuerdo con la encuesta semestral del  BCE”, in the “Informe trimestral de la 
economía española”, Boletín Económico, December 2015. For the BLS, see, M. García-Posada (2016), 
“Encuesta sobre préstamos bancarios en España: enero de 2016”, Boletín Económico, January, Banco de 
España. The indicator on access to credit based on the Central Credit Register can be found in the Financial 
Stability Report of the Banco de España, November 2015, p. 31.
23  Compared with the euro area, note that the participation of Spanish banks in TLTROs was above the euro area 
average and that the indicators provided in panel 5 of Chart 3.5 are calculated only on the basis of the responses 
of the institutions that participated in this programme. Consequently, where the level of the indicator is the same 
in the two areas, the effect on the banking system will be higher in Spain given that these impacts affect a 
greater proportion of institutions.
24  Specifically, error correction models were estimated in which the above-mentioned variables are included in the 
long-term relationship. The estimation was performed with data from the period January 2003-April 2014.
25  The path of interest rates in the absence of measures is constructed under the following assumptions. First, it 
is considered that interbank rates would have remained constant, therefore attributing the full change in them 
to monetary policy measures. Second, the effects attributable to the central bank’s action based on the event 
study in the previous section were discounted from the other financial variables. Third, for the unemployment 
rate, we use the results of a first estimate of the effects of monetary policy, according to the methodology 
described in the next section which did not take into account the effect of the fall in the unemployment rate on 
interest rates on credit.
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The available empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of non-conventional 
monetary policy measures deployed recently by the ECB and, in particular, of the Asset 
Purchase Programme currently under way, is still very limited. According to Constâncio 
(2016)26, ECB experts have estimated that, without the monetary policy measures, euro 
area inflation would have been around 0.3 pp lower in 2015 and would be at very negative 
levels during 2016. Likewise, he attributes approximately 0.7 pp of growth recorded in the 
last two years to monetary policy.
A recent attempt to estimate the impact of the ECB’s quantitative easing measures on 
the euro ares economy has been developed at the Banco de España in Burriel and 
Galesi (2016)27, which is explained in detail in Box 3.2. The results confirm that the 
ECB’s quantitative easing policy is seemingly having a positive impact on economic 
activity in the euro area, thus contributing to countering the deflationary trends that 
have recently affected the area.
The macroeconomic impact of the ECB’s Asset Purchase Programme28 can be simulated 
on the basis of the above-mentioned study. Taken with due caution and considering the 
estimation difficulties discussed in the box, the positive contribution of the Asset Purchase 
Programme to the GDP growth rate and to inflation in the euro area in 2015 is estimated to 
be 0.7 pp and 0.3 pp, respectively (see Chart 3.6). The impact projected for 2016, which is 
surrounded by greater uncertainty, is approximately 0.7 pp for GDP growth and 0.8 pp for 
the inflation rate. This measurement is of a comparable order of magnitude to that referred 
to in Constâncio (2016), although the estimation exercises are not fully comparable. It is 
necessary to point out that this type of approach does not usually consider other potentially 
very significant effects of central bank action geared towards eliminating or substantially 
reducing the probability of adverse risk scenarios that are difficult to quantify and with 
potentially very high costs for the economy, such as a hypothetical scenario of a persistent 
widespread fall in prices.
The estimation presented in Box 3.2 also suggests two results of interest regarding the 
transmission channels of the quantitative easing programme. First, the portfolio 
rebalancing channel which operates through the increase in the relative pricing of private 
assets and the depreciation of the exchange rate contributes most to explaining the total 
effects. Second, the estimations reveal some differences in the strength of the credit 
channel across the various countries in the period under analysis; this channel was 
stronger in the so-called core euro area countries than in the more vulnerable ones. This 
asymmetry would explain that, although the improvement in financing conditions during 
the period analysed was greater in the second group of countries, the response of activity 
5  A quantification of the 
macroeconomic impact 
of monetary policy 
5.1  THE EFFECTS IN THE EURO 
AREA
Evidence on the macroeconomic 
effects of the expansionary 
measures introduced since 2014 
is still limited
The estimates made suggest 
that the ECB balance sheet 
expansion has had significant 
positive effects on growth and 
inflation in the euro area...
...with certain cross-country 
differences...
26  V. Constâncio (2016), In defence of monetary policy, Opinion piece, 11 March, European Central Bank.
27  They used a global structural vector autoregressive (GSVAR) econometric model estimated with monthly data 
as from 2008 in which the ECB monetary policy stimulus is identified from the performance of the central bank’s 
balance sheet. See P. Burriel and A. Galesi (2016), Unconventional monetary policies in the euro area: a global 
VAR analysis, mimeo.
28   Using a baseline scenario excluding the purchase programme – in which the balance sheet follows the path 
marked by the model in the absence of shocks – a scenario with a purchase programme is constructed where 
the programme’s regular purchases according to the decision of December 2015 (€60 billion per month until 
March 2017) are added to the central bank’s balance sheet. The decision of March 2016 to increase the volume 
of purchases to €80  billion as from April 2016 is considered separately. The exercise does not include, 
consequently, the effects of, or the interaction with, other measures such as the decrease in the deposit facility 
rate and does not take into account relevant characteristics in the programme such as the asset class acquired.
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to the monetary stimulus could have been slightly higher in the core countries of the 
area.29
The latter result is analysed in detail within the framework of a theoretical macroeconomic 
model developed at the Banco de España by Arce, Hurtado and Thomas (2015) (see Box 
3.3). In this model the bottlenecks in the monetary transmission mechanism in the most 
vulnerable countries occur due to the negative effect of pre-existing excessive indebtedness 
levels on new credit flows. Thus, the positive impact of the ECB’s quantitative easing 
programme on asset values results in a sharper increase in credit and private spending in 
the core countries of the monetary union than in those of corporations and households in 
the more vulnerable economies which have greater indebtedness levels and are immersed 
in a deleveraging process.
Another possible source of asymmetry in the strength of the credit channel would be the 
greater weakness shown by the financial system in the more vulnerable countries, 
especially during the early stages of the crisis, which could have limited their capacity to 
increase lending30. Accordingly, the improvement in the balance sheet position of the 
banks, resulting from the restructuring of the financial sector or the lower financial 
fragmentation arising from progress in the banking union process, should tend to bolster 
the expansionary effects of monetary policy on the economic activity of the area as a 
whole.
...given the bottlenecks in the 
transmission mechanism in 
certain countries
IMPACT OF THE ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMME (APP) ON GDP AND INFLATION
IN THE EURO AREA (a)
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SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Estimation in accordance with Burriel and Galesi (2016). The ECB March projection exercise does not include the effects of the measures adopted at the March 
meeting of the Governing Council. For this reason, in order to construct the counterfactual path in the absence of APP, only the effects of the measures adopted 
until December are considered.
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
29  For more details on asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy, see M. Ciccarelli, A. Maddaloni and 
J. L. Peydró (2013), “Heterogeneous Transmission Mechanism: Monetary Policy and Financial Fragility in the 
Euro Area”, Economic Policy, July, Vol.  28-75, pp. 459-512; L. Gambacorta, B. Hofmann and G. Peersman 
(2014), “Effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy at the zero lower bound: a cross-country analysis”, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 46(4), pp 615-642; and M. Mandler, M. Scharnargl and U. Volz (2016), 
Heterogeneity in euro-area monetary policy transmission: results from a large multi-country BVAR model, 
Discussion Paper No. 03/2016, Deutsche Bundesbank.
30  For evidence of this channel, see J. Boeckx, M. Dossche and G. Peersman (2014), Effectiveness and 
Transmission of the ECB’s Balance Sheet Policies, Woking Paper No 4907, CESifo.
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The Quarterly Model of Banco de España (MTBE, by its Spanish abbreviation)31 allows the 
impact on the Spanish economy during 2015 and 2016 of the measures adopted by the 
ECB Governing Council as from spring 2014 to be approximately estimated. The monetary 
policy stimulus operates through the various channels discussed in Section 4.2 and also 
comprises the trade channel, which includes the expansionary effect on the euro area 
economy and its boost to Spanish exports.
The upper panel of Table 3.2 summarises the changes in the exogenous variables of the 
model which were used to estimate the effects. Specifically, for the three-month 
EURIBOR and lending standards, the change since spring 2014 is used, implicitly 
assuming therefore, that the whole of this change is attributable to monetary policy32. 
For the other financial variables and the exchange rate, the calibration is based on the 
5.2  THE EFFECTS ON THE 
SPANISH ECONOMY
The Quarterly Model of Banco 
de España estimates the 
effects of monetary policy on 
the Spanish economy through 
various channels
61025102
Financing conditions
    Three-month EURIBOR 5.0-4.0-
    Ten-year government bonds 3.1-1.1-
    Interest rates on housing loans to households 5.0-4.0-
    Total cost of financing NFCs 7.0-4.0-
    Conditions of consumer credit and other lending to households 0.5-8.3-
    Conditions of housing loans to households 6.5-8.2-
    Conditions of loans to corporations 5.2-5.2-
Stock exchange 1.515.7
Euro exchange rate 4.01-1.01-
GDP of other euro area countries 4.17.0
Imports of other euro area countries 8.24.1
GDP 2.16.0
Private consumption 7.02.0
Private productive investment 8.30.2
Residential investment 5.25.0
Goods and services exports 9.26.1
Goods and services imports 4.22.1
Contributions to GDP growth
    National demand (excl. change in inventories) 1.14.0
    Net exports 2.02.0
CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy 4.01.0
HICP 9.06.0
SPAIN. EFFECTS OF THE ECB MONETARY POLICY MEASURES (a) TABLE 3.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Percentage deviations from the baseline scenario levels. The lower panel estimates the effect of the changes described in the upper panel with the Quarterly  Model 
of Banco de España. See S. Hurtado, P. Manzano, E. Ortega and A. Urtasun (2014), Update and re-estimation of the Quarterly Model of Banco de España (MTBE), 
Occasional Paper, No. 1403, Banco de España.
31  The MTBE is a large-scale macroeconometric model used to make medium-term projections of the Spanish 
economy and to simulate alternative scenarios. It represents the Spanish economy as a small open economy 
which is integrated into a monetary union and whose performance is essentially determined by the demand 
side, especially in the short term. For more details, see A. Estrada, J. L. Fernández, E. Moral and A. V. Regil 
(2004), A quarterly macroeconometric model of the Spanish economy, Working Paper, No. 0413, Banco de 
España and S. Hurtado, P. Manzano, E. Ortega and A. Urtasun (2014), Update and re-estimation of the quarterly 
model of Banco de España (MTBE), Occasional Paper, No. 1403, Banco de España.
32  The effects estimated should be interpreted, consequently, as upper limits on the real effects which could be 
expected in practice.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 83 ANNUAL REPORT, 2015 3. THE EFFECT OF THE ECB’S MONETARY POLICIES IN THE RECENT PERIOD
analysis performed in Section 433. Lastly, the effects are estimated for euro area GDP 
and the imports of the other countries in the area, using the exercise in Box 3.2.
The lower panel of Table 3.2 includes the overall effect of these changes in financial and 
external conditions on the average annual growth rates of the main aggregates of the 
Spanish economy in the period 2015-2016. The greatest expansionary effects are observed 
in private productive investment by corporations, which benefit from a higher estimated 
reduction in their cost of borrowing and respond to the better outlook for the Spanish and 
European economies as a result of the monetary stimulus, and in exports, owing to the 
growth of activity of Spain’s trading partners in the euro area and on account of the 
depreciation vis-à-vis trading partners outside the euro area. Imports also reacted to the 
final demand stimulus with the result that the contribution of net exports to GDP growth is 
lower than that of domestic demand. According to the results, the ECB’s monetary policy 
measures contributed to raising the level of GDP by around 1.2  pp at the end of the 
simulation period.
As shown in Chart 3.7, which breaks down the estimated total effects on GDP, the most 
important contribution stems from the trade channel through the growth induced in the 
euro area and its effect on our exports. Specifically, this would explain 44% of the 
cumulative increase in activity at end-2016. For its part, the exchange rate channel also 
played a significant role, explaining up to 23% of the total effect. Finally, the wealth effect 
(stock market gains) and the improvement in financing conditions (lower rates and more 
favourable supply terms) would each explain 16%.
On the prices side, it is estimated that monetary policy actions in this period contributed 
to raising the annual average inflation rate of the HICP by 0.6 pp in 2015 and a further 
0.3 pp in 2016. The main channel of transmission to prices over the two years was the 
increase induced by the depreciation of the euro in the cost of imports, especially energy 
imports.
The estimates suggest that 
the monetary policy stimulus 
contributed to a cumulative 
increase in GDP of around 
1.2 pp in the period 
2015-2016...
...mainly on account of its 
impact on the growth of our 
trading partners and the 
nominal effective exchange 
rate of the euro...
...and a cumulative increase in 
prices of 1 pp until 2016
16
16
23
44
1  EFFECT ON THE CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN GDP IN 2015-2016
%
CHART 3.7ESTIMATED EFFECT OF ECB MONETARY POLICY MEASURES ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY. 
BREAKDOWN BY CHANNEL (a)
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2  EFFECT ON THE CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN HICP IN 2015-2016
%
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Estimation of the effect of the change in variables described in the upper panel of Table 3.2 with the Quarterly Model of Banco de España. See S. Hurtado, P. 
Manzano, E. Ortega and A. Urtasun (2014), Update and re-estimation of the Quarterly Model of Banco de España (MTBE), Occasional Paper,  No. 1403, Banco 
de España.
 FINANCIAL CONDITIONS  WEALTH EFFECT  EXCHANGE RATE  TRADE CHANNEL
33  The middle of the estimated range was used in the case of interest rates on credit.
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Beginning in spring 2014, there were increasing signs of the existence of downward risks 
to maintaining the medium-term price stability target. Since then, the Governing Council of 
the ECB has used, within its mandate, a broad raft of conventional and non-conventional 
measures to avoid the adverse consequences which would arise from a protracted period 
of excessively low inflation for the euro area as a whole. As analysed in this chapter, the 
ECB’s action was effective in providing the monetary stimulus required by the demanding 
macroeconomic environment and appreciably eased the financing conditions of the 
economy. Considered overall, this action will help to sustain the economic recovery of the 
euro area and will quicken, therefore, the gradual return of inflation to rates more in line 
with the medium-term monetary policy reference.
From a more general standpoint, the actions of the Governing Council have demonstrated that 
despite the specific institutional features of the euro area, the ECB has a broad raft of monetary 
policy instruments, comparable with that available to the central banks of other developed 
economies. As shown by international experience, the capacity to deploy flexibly this set of 
instruments is essential for ensuring that monetary policy remains effective when official interest 
rates are close to the zero lower bound, thus guaranteeing the correct anchoring of inflation 
expectations around values which are in line with the medium-term target.
Despite the extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy stance and the momentum 
from cheaper energy prices, the pace of recovery in the euro area remains modest, weighed 
down by persistently high levels of unemployment and public and private indebtedness. 
Economic growth has been based on the strength of private consumption, while private 
productive investment has failed to take off, affected by the high uncertainty and growing 
risks about changes in external demand. While it is foreseeable that in the short term the 
growth rate of consumer prices will rise gradually as the direct effects of the drop in oil 
prices are diluted, weak aggregate demand, excess capacity and moderate wage 
developments will continue to exert negative pressure on euro area inflation. Under these 
circumstances, ensuring that inflation gradually returns to values close to the benchmark 
of 2% is the main challenge for ECB monetary policy.
Encouraging spending and investment decisions, which necessarily involve risk, is an 
essential part of the monetary policy transmission mechanism under the current 
circumstances. In this setting, it cannot be ruled out that situations may arise in certain 
parts of the economic and financial system which prompt resources to be allocated 
inefficiently and which possibly cause financial stability problems. Notwithstanding the 
fact that in the current situation no risk factors of this type have been detected for the euro 
area as a whole, ensuring the synergic action of monetary and macroprudential policy is 
shaping up as one of the major challenges for the coming years. The pressure exerted by 
the setting of low nominal growth and very low interest rates on the returns of financial 
intermediation and, in particular, the banking business34 should be monitored.
Similarly, under the current circumstances, laying the foundations for a sound and lasting 
recovery of activity, productive investment and employment in the euro area requires the 
involvement of other economic policies – particularly in the fiscal and structural arenas and 
in the area of strengthening the institutional arrangements of the economic and monetary 
union. Thus, euro area countries should use the room for manoeuvre afforded by the 
Stability and Growth Pact, depending on the specific situation of their public finances, to 
6  Conclusions and 
challenges 
Since spring 2014, the 
Governing Council of the ECB 
has used a broad raft of 
conventional and non-
conventional measures 
available to it,...
...which are comparable with 
those of other central banks
Despite the accommodative 
monetary policy stance, the 
euro area economy continues 
to recover very moderately, 
with inflation rates far from the 
medium-term objective
These circumstances pose 
considerable challenges in 
various areas such as financial 
stability...
...and should be tackled with 
the involvement of other 
economic policies, including 
the use of fiscal and structural 
measures as well as those to 
strengthen the institutional 
arrangements of the economic 
and monetary union
34  See the Financial Stability Report of the Banco de España and the Financial Stability Review of the European 
Central Bank, both of May 2016.
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apply policies to support aggregate demand and activity. Likewise, it is important for 
governments to recommence the reform drive,35 to introduce improvements in the 
functioning of product and factor markets and in the business environment, and to 
complete the European governance framework.
35  See M. Draghi (2015), Monetary policy and structural reforms in the euro area, speech of 14 December 2015, 
and Chapter 4 of the 2014 Annual Report of the Banco de España. Ó. Arce, S. Hurtado and C. Thomas (2015), 
Policy Spillovers and Synergies in a Monetary Union, Working Paper, No. 1540, Banco de España, analyse the 
synergies arising from the joint application of non-conventional monetary policies with structural reforms and 
fiscal measures in the framework of an asymmetrical monetary union.
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The various measures implemented by the Eurosystem over the 
last two years have led to more favourable financing conditions for 
Spanish banks overall, and also to improving their liquidity 
situation. As discussed in the main text of this chapter, it is 
estimated that these measures contributed to increasing credit 
supply, mainly as a result of the lower cost of lending. This box 
provides empirical evidence of these effects and their asymmetric 
impact on different credit institutions. For this purpose, the various 
estimates presented in this box link the relative performance of 
various Spanish institutions since the Eurosystem’s new measures 
were launched in June 2014 with their starting point, in terms of 
their financing costs and the extent to which they have used the 
new facilities.
In the case of TLTROs, as the chart below (panel 1) shows, there is 
a marked heterogeneity as regards the extent to which Spanish 
banks have had recourse to them.1 An analysis based on simple 
correlations shows that the amount requested in the first five bids 
(between September 2014 and September 2015), as a proportion 
of total assets, is positively correlated with various individual 
characteristics, such as the size, the net debtor position in the 
interbank market, the weight of financing other than deposits from 
Spanish households and non-financial corporations and the non-
performing loans ratio.
The positive correlation with the interbank debtor position and 
with the weight of wholesale funding may be related to the higher 
relative cost of this type of funding when set against retail funding. 
Lastly, the non-performing loans ratio could be indicative of the 
marginal cost for institutions of accessing new funds, i.e. the 
higher the cost, the stronger the incentive to resort to TLTROs.2
A multivariate regression analysis shows that the two most 
explanatory variables are non-performing loans and the weight in 
the balance sheet of the recourse to the Eurosystem before 
TLTROs were introduced, which jointly explain almost three 
quarters of the variability across institutions. These results would 
support the assumption that it was precisely the institutions which 
had the highest relative costs of access to finance which made the 
greatest use of the new facilities.
In the case of the securities purchase programme, it is estimated 
that the most significant effects on institutions arose as a result of 
the pass-through of lower government bond yields to other 
instruments traded in the financial markets, including securities 
issued by financial institutions. This is likely to have particularly 
benefited the banks with the greatest weight of market-based 
financing, measured, for example, using the loan-deposit ratio,3 
which, as shown in panel 2 of the chart below, also revealed 
considerable heterogeneity between institutions in December 
2014, before the expansion of the programme to include public 
debt was announced.
More generally, the set of measures implemented by the 
Eurosystem since June 2014 would be expected to have had a 
greater expansionary effect on the supply of bank credit of 
institutions facing higher financing costs before that date and, 
consequently, also applying higher interest rates on credit. In 
keeping with this, available evidence points to a negative 
correlation between the interest rates applied by Spanish banks to 
their customers in May 2014 and later developments. Thus, the 
institutions which had less favourable financing conditions and 
consequently faced higher average interest rates on term deposits, 
were those which were subsequently able to reduce the rates to a 
greater degree (see panel 3 of the chart below). Likewise, the 
institutions with the highest interest rates on new loans to non-
financial corporations are also those which would be expected to 
have lowered them the most following implementation of the new 
measures (see panel 4 of the chart below).
The Table below shows the relationship between the different 
variables indicating the financial position of institutions in May 
2014 or their participation in the TLTROs and subsequent 
performance of lending and the cost at which new loans are 
granted. The first two columns show that the institutions which 
had the greatest recourse to TLTRO funds were also those which 
reduced their interest rates the most on lending to non-financial 
corporations, including smaller-volume loans, generally relating to 
loans to SMEs. However, the effects on interest rates of credit to 
households do not differ significantly considering the extent to 
which TLTROs were used, nor were notable differences detected 
in the recent behaviour of lending.4
Considering the remaining variables analysed which attempt to 
approximate, in one way or another, the degree of difficulty of access 
to finance faced by institutions before the programmes were 
BOX 3.1MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY MEASURES ON CREDIT SUPPLY 
IN SPAIN
1  The results shown in this box are based on a sample of Spanish banks 
(excluding the subsidiaries of other Spanish or foreign banks), which 
have provided information on the interest rates on their new lending 
business with customers. The institutions which have participated jointly 
in the Eurosystem’s TLTRO bids are considered as a single institution. 
The result is a sample of 20 institutions, representing 85 % of total credit 
in Spain and 95 % of TLTRO applications.
2  This marginal cost is difficult to measure. For institutions participating in 
the financial markets and issuing securities listed on exchanges, this 
cost can be measured by the value of the associated CDSs. However, 
the Spanish banks in this situation are too few to allow for a reliable 
statistical analysis. The costs of term deposits could be considered an 
alternative approximation. However, these vary from one institution to 
another, not only due to the different marginal costs, but also depending 
on the idiosyncratic features of their customers and the financing 
strategies in place at each bank.
3  The higher the ratio, the lower the proportion of credit financed with 
retail funds (deposits) and, therefore, the higher the proportion of credit 
financed through other channels, mainly the markets.
4  Various regression analyses have been conducted, based on specific 
supply and demand variables and including an analysis of credit supply 
at bank-firm level using data from the Central Credit Register. However, 
the results are not reliable, owing to the relatively small number of 
observations available and the difficulty of adequately measuring the 
different channels (direct and indirect) through which the Eurosystem 
measures may have had a bearing on institutions.
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BOX 3.1 MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY MEASURES ON CREDIT SUPPLY 
IN SPAIN (cont’d)
*04.052.082.071.033.090.030.040.0-snaol gnisuoH
Consumer loans and other lending -0.08 -0.19 0.37 -0.21 -0.05 -0.40 * -0.12 -0.12
*34.0-31.0-***56.0-**55.0-**25.0-32.0-**26.0-**95.0-sCFN ot snaoL
Loans to NFCs  <250,000 euros -0.61 *** -0.40 * 0.11 -0.51 ** -0.48 ** -0.60 *** -0.33 -0.40 *
Year-on-year growth 
of loans in Sep-15
22.0-43.0-32.0-**74.0-90.072.041.0-*93.0-snaol gnisuoH
Consumer loans and other lending 0.33 0.16 -0.31 -0.16 0.38 * 0.33 0.40 * 0.14
**55.023.060.060.0-43.071.0-71.001.0sCFN ot snaoL
Eligible loans in TLTROs 0.31 0.20 -0.11 0.29 0.27 0.13 0.50 ** 0.60 ***
Total loans to households and NFCs -0.12 0.17 0.31 0.42 * -0.21 0.11 0.17 0.48 **
Table 1
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BANK VARIABLES AND SUBSEQUENT BEHAVIOUR OF CREDIT
Term-deposit int. rate (d)TLTRO/TA (c)Change in interest rates 
between May-14 and Sep-15 Simple Weighted (e) Simple Weighted (e) 
NPL ratio (d)
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Loan-deposit ratio (d)
Simple Weighted (e) 
Chart 1
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: *, **, *** indicate a correlation ratio which is significantly different from zero, at a confidence level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.
a Corresponding to a sample of 20 institutions representing 85 % of total credit in Spain and 95% of TLTRO applications. It excludes Spanish and foreign subsidiaries 
and considers all those institutions which jointly submitted bids for TLTRO funds as a single institution.
b Accumulated in the first five bids (September 2014 to September 2015).
c Total volume requested in the first five TLTRO bids as a proportion of total assets.
d In May 2014. 
e Correlation calculated by means of weighting observations by the total volume of lending to customers. 
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announced and, consequently, the likely impact of these programmes 
on them, a significant effect in the same direction can be observed 
on the interest rates on credit to non-financial corporations, but not 
in the case of credit to households. As regards the changes in the 
amount of lending, there is some evidence of positive correlations in 
certain segments and in respect of certain variables, such as the 
loan-deposit ratio. This result suggest that the amount of lending of 
institutions which had a higher loan-deposit ratio, and which in 
principle would have benefited more from a reduction of market-
based financing costs, tended to perform more dynamically than 
that of the other intermediaries.
Overall, the results shown in this box are consistent with the 
positive impact of the Eurosystem measures on credit supply 
conditions in Spain, particularly visible in the case of loans to non-
financial corporations. It is estimated that these effects were more 
marked at institutions which had started out from less generous 
funding conditions.
BOX 3.1 MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY MEASURES ON CREDIT SUPPLY 
IN SPAIN (cont’d)
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BOX 3.2 AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE QUANTITATIVE EASING 
PROGRAMME
This box simulates the macroeconomic impact of a quantitative 
easing programme similar to that implemented by the ECB, using a 
global structural vector autoregressive model developed in Burriel 
and Galesi (2016). The model efficiently combines aggregate euro 
area data on changes in monetary policy instruments1 with other 
national data on economic activity and the financial position of 
each member state, with monthly data covering the period 
2008-2015. In addition to GDP and consumer prices, the national 
variables include others that allow a distinction to be drawn by 
transmission channel. Along with the exchange rate, the model 
considers a measure of credit risk premium2 and new lending to 
capture transmission through the credit channel, as well as an 
asset price variable to reflect the portfolio readjustment channel.
Estimating the macroeconomic effects of the ECB’s quantitative 
easing measures is a complex exercise. There is no precedent for 
the extent to which central banks have used non-standard 
instruments since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, which 
means that the empirical analysis must be concentrated on a 
relatively short period. An added difficulty is the wide range of 
non-standard measures that the ECB has used in the various 
phases of the crisis.
In line with the most recent literature, the model uses the change 
in the Eurosystem balance sheet as a variable to capture the 
interventions of the monetary authority. In particular, non-standard 
monetary policy decisions are identified by exogenous balance 
sheet expansion: that is, an expansion that is not a response to 
heightened financial tightening and that, at the same time, 
increases the negative spread between very short-term interbank 
rates and the interest rate on the main refinancing operations. The 
first condition excludes changes in the ECB’s balance sheet that 
arise from banking system liquidity requirements in the face of 
stress situations. This is especially relevant in a setting in which 
the monetary authority has kept to its liquidity-providing policy 
with full allotment of the demand for liquidity. The second condition 
identifies measures that actually increase the level of banks’ 
excess reserves, which should bring very short-term money 
market rates (Eonia) closer to the ECB’s deposit facility rate.
To illustrate the effects, the chart shows the response functions of 
the model’s main variables to an exogenous shock to the size of 
the central bank’s balance sheet (equivalent to a standard 
deviation of that size). The monetary impulse significantly increases 
economic activity and prices in the euro area as a whole, through 
several channels: the portfolio rebalancing channel, by means of 
the increase in the relative price of private assets; the exchange 
rate channel, through a real depreciation of the euro; and the credit 
channel. In the latter case, the decline in the risk premium on 
lending to non-financial corporations is significant for the euro 
area as a whole, while the growth in new lending is only significant 
for non-vulnerable countries. In the case of inflation expectations, 
although they respond in the expected direction, the estimated 
impact is not statistically significant.
From a disaggregated standpoint, these results point to certain 
possible differences in the effect of non-standard monetary policy 
between different groups of euro area countries. In fact, the 
estimated impact on growth is greater in the core countries than in 
the more vulnerable ones, while in the case of inflation the opposite 
is the case, although the limited length of the period analysed 
means that it is not possible to conclude that these differences are 
statistically significant.3 Analysis of the various transmission 
channels reveals a relative degree of homogeneity across 
countries, except in the functioning of the credit channel. In that 
case, new lending only increases significantly in certain countries 
(Germany and France), even though the decline in firms’ risk 
premium is on a similar scale. There are two, possibly 
complementary, explanations for this. First, the high indebtedness 
of households and firms in the more vulnerable countries may 
make it difficult for the improvement in credit conditions prompted 
by a more expansionary monetary policy stance to pass through 
to an increase in new lending (see exercise in Box 3.3). Moreover, 
it is in general in the more vulnerable countries where banks have 
displayed most fragility, especially during the initial phases of the 
crisis, which may have limited their ability to increase credit.4
To sum up, the empirical evidence analysed suggests that the 
quantitative easing measures taken by the ECB are helping to 
invigorate aggregate demand and activity and, therefore, to 
combat the deflationary trends affecting the euro area. One of the 
main reasons for their effectiveness seems to rely on the fact that 
measures of this kind, together with the progress made in the 
Banking Union process and other steps taken at a national level, 
such as the restructuring of banking sectors, have helped to 
reduce financial fragmentation in the euro area. This progress, 
together with other measures still pending in the field of Banking 
Union and the Capital Markets Union, should prompt a more 
uniform credit flow among the euro area countries and should, 
therefore, make common monetary policy more effective.
1  Five aggregate euro area variables are included: growth in Eurosystem 
balance sheet assets; the interest rate on the main refinancing 
operations; the spread between that rate and the overnight interest rate 
(Eonia); a financial stress indicator; and long-term inflation expectations.
2  The credit risk premium is, for each country, the spread of non-financial 
firms’ corporate bond yields over government bond yields, in accordance 
with S.  Gilchrist and B.  Mojon (2014), Credit risk in the euro area, 
Working Paper 20041, National Bureau of Economic Research.
3  A total of 19 euro area countries are considered, including among the 
more vulnerable countries Italy, Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia and Malta.
4  See J. Boeckx, M. Dossche and G. Peersman (2014), Effectiveness and 
transmission of the ECB’s balance sheet policies, Working Paper, 
Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique.
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BOX 3.2 AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE QUANTITATIVE EASING 
PROGRAMME (cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NB: The shaded area represents the confidence interval of a standard deviation relating to the estimated impact for the euro area.
a This group includes Italy, Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia and Malta.
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AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF QUANTITATIVE EASING
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This box analyses some of the main transmission channels of a 
government Asset Purchase Programme similar to that 
implemented by the ECB since early 2015, using as the framework 
of analysis the macroeconomic model of a monetary union 
comprising two dissimilar areas (“vulnerable countries” and “core 
countries”) developed by Arce, Hurtado and Thomas (2015).1
In the model, households and firms in each country have long-
term debt, and their capacity to borrow is limited by the value of 
their assets admissible as collateral. In addition, the national tax 
authorities issue both short and long-term public debt, with a yield 
spread over short-term interest rates that depends positively on 
the volume of private-sector-held long-term debt.2
In order to isolate the effect of an Asset Purchase Programme, first 
a baseline scenario is built, including some of the characteristic 
features of the present macro-financial situation in the euro area. 
Thus, the nominal interest rate set by the common monetary 
authority has an effective lower bound, against a backdrop of 
persistently low inflation across the whole of the euro area as a 
result of the weakness of aggregate demand. Moreover, the 
vulnerable countries are immersed in a deleveraging process in 
which both households and firms are gradually paring down their 
debt. This phase lasts until they recover a sufficient level of net 
financial wealth and are again able to access credit. This scenario 
is characterised by persistently weak growth throughout the euro 
area, especially in the vulnerable countries, owing to that 
deleveraging process.
Taking this base scenario as a starting point, the model simulates 
the implementation of a long-term government bond purchase 
programme in which the central bank acquires new bonds in an 
amount with a distribution by country similar to that of the ECB’s 
Asset Purchase Programme.3 The model is calibrated such that 
the purchase programme reduces long-term government bond 
yields to a similar extent as estimated in a range of studies; in 
particular, the effect of the programme on sovereign yields in the 
core euro area is estimated as approximately one third of the effect 
on sovereign yields in the vulnerable countries.4
The chart illustrates the effects of the bond purchase programme on 
the main macroeconomic variables.5 The programme has a clearly 
expansionary effect on economic activity in both areas (the 
vulnerable and the core countries). This is because the programme 
reduces long-term government bond yields, which encourages 
households to increase their consumption spending, with the 
consequent expansionary effect on aggregate demand.6
In addition to the channel indicated, which operates in both parts 
of the euro area, there are other specific channels in each. In the 
core euro area, the positive effect of the programme on the value 
of assets that serve as collateral in loans translates into an increase 
in credit and, therefore, higher private spending, thus reinforcing 
the impact of the programme. In the vulnerable countries, although 
the programme also increases the value of collateral, neither 
households nor firms can benefit immediately as they are 
immersed in a relatively protracted deleveraging process. This 
asymmetric response of lending activity in the core euro area and 
the vulnerable countries, which is consistent with the evidence for 
the euro area shown in Box 3.2, would explain why in the short 
term the expansionary effects of the programme are somewhat 
higher in the core euro area.
Nevertheless, the increase in the value of assets will allow the 
net wealth of households and firms in the vulnerable countries to 
reach the minimum levels necessary in order to access credit 
again sooner. Accordingly, the programme is effective in 
reducing the duration and intensity of the deleveraging phase 
and, therefore, in bringing forward the recovery in the flow of 
credit and activity in the vulnerable economies.7 An added effect 
that encourages the deleveraging process in the vulnerable 
countries is the “debt inflation” channel whereby the additional 
inflation that is produced by the Asset Purchase Programme 
reduces the real value of the nominal debt burden of households 
and firms. The combination of the above-mentioned channels 
explains the uptick observed in the medium term in the 
expansionary effects of the programme on private credit, private 
consumption and GDP in that group of countries (see panels 5, 3 
and 2, respectively).
Lastly, the additional inflation generated by a measure of this kind 
allows the central bank to regain room for manoeuvre in terms of 
standard monetary policy earlier, following the initial constraint 
represented by the effective lower bound on interest rates, as 
shown in panel 6 of the chart.8
BOX 3.3A MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSMISSION CHANNELS OF QUANTITATIVE EASING 
IN A MONETARY UNION
1  Ó.  Arce, S.  Hurtado and C.  Thomas (2015), “Policy Spillovers and 
Synergies in a Monetary Union”, Working Paper 1540, Banco de España.
2  See H.  Chen, V.  Cúrdia and A.  Ferrero (2012), “The Macroeconomic 
Effects of Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programmes”, Economic Journal, 
122.
3  Specifically based on the initial configuration of the ECB’s Asset 
Purchase Programme, with monthly purchases of €60 billion, mostly in 
long-term government bonds.
4  In accordance with C. Altavilla, G. Carboni and R. Motto (2015), “Asset 
purchase programmes and financial markets; lessons from the euro 
area”, Working Paper 1864, November, ECB. 
5  Specifically, the chart shows the differences in the changes in those 
variables compared with the base scenario.
6  The investment response is comparatively smaller than the consumption 
response in both areas.
7  For a detailed discussion of this aspect in the context of a similar model, 
see J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and C. Thomas (2014), Structural reforms in a 
debt overhang, Working Paper 1421, Banco de España. 
8  In the model, the standard monetary policy rule is a “Taylor rule” whereby 
the nominal interest rate responds positively to deviations of inflation 
from its long-term target in the euro area as a whole. Thus, starting from 
a situation in which the interest rate according to that rule is temporarily 
below the zero bound, higher inflation (such as that produced by the 
Asset Purchase Programme) means that the interest rate will be quicker 
to rise above the lower bound.
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BOX 3.3 A MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSMISSION CHANNELS OF QUANTITATIVE EASING 
IN A MONETARY UNION (cont’d)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Chart 1
A SIMULATION OF THE EFECTS OF A GOVERNMENT DEBT PURCHASE PROGRAMME USING A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
